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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Troy Lane Evans appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The relevant facts and course of proceedings of the underlying case were 
outlined by the district court in its order granting respondent's motion for 
summary dismissal and denying petitioner's motion for summary disposition: 
On August 18, 2010, Petitioner, Troy Lane Evans, entered a 
guilty plea and was sentenced to five (5) years determinate, 
followed by ten (10) years indeterminate, with the Court retaining 
jurisdiction for 365 days for Count VII of an Amended Indictment, 
Sexual Abuse of a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age, a felony. Mr. 
Evans successfully completed the retained jurisdiction program and 
the sentence was suspended with the Petitioner placed on 
probation by an order entered January 27, 2011. The Petitioner 
then admitted violating his probation and the original sentence was 
imposed by Order Revoking Probation, Judgment of Conviction and 
Order of Commitment, entered on September 15, 2011. The term 
of confinement in the September 15, 2011 order was corrected to 
match the August 18, 2010 order in a corrected judgment entered 
April 18, 2012, nunc pro tune September 15, 2011. The Petitioner 
requested reconsideration of the sentence under Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 which was denied in an order entered January 5, 2012. 
The Petitioner did not file an appeal in this matter. 
(R., pp.102-103.) 
Evans filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief and affidavit. 
(R., pp.5-8.) The state filed an answer to Evan's pro se petition for post-
conviction relief (R., pp.32-37) as well as a motion for summary dismissal (R., 
pp.46-49). The district court later appointed counsel to assist Evans in his post-
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conviction relief case (R., p.55), who filed an amended petition for relief asserting 
five separate bases of ineffectiveness of counsel including trial counsel's failure 
to investigate the charges against Evans and a conflict of counsel in the dual 
representation of Evans and his co-defendant wife leading to his alleged 
involuntary guilty plea (R., pp.65-69). The state filed an answer to Evans' 
amended petition for post-conviction (R., pp.83-86) and a motion for summary 
dismissal of the amended petition (R., pp.87-94). Evans filed a cross-motion for 
summary disposition of two of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(R., pp.95-97; see also R., pp.98-101.) 
One of Evans' claims of ineffective assistance of counsel included an 
allegation that he was incorrectly advised of the terms of the plea agreement. 
(R., p.1-3.) Following the correction of a clerical error in Evans' judgment of 
conviction, this claim was withdrawn. (Id.) Additional claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel asserting a conflict of interest and inadequate preparation 
by counsel were dismissed by written order following a hearing wherein the court 
found Evans had failed to establish trial counsel's performance was deficient or 
any resulting prejudice. (R., pp.102-122.) 
Evans timely appealed. (R., pp.122-127.) 
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ISSUE 
Evans states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. 
Evans' claim that his defense counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by representing both Mr. Evan and his co-defendant. 
2. Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. 
Evans' claim that his defense counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by not conducting a sufficient investigation of the 
charges filed against Mr. Evans. 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue as follows: 
Has Evans failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
Evans Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A Introduction 
Evans contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition 
for post-conviction relief. (Appellant's brief, pp. 2-16.) Evans addresses only two 
of the claims of ineffective assistance originally asserted in his amended petition 
for post-conviction relief. Evans first contends the district court erred in 
concluding the entry of his plea was not the result of dual representation 
amounting to a conflict of interest. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-12.) Evans' second 
contention is that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his assertion 
trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation of the charges against 
him. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-16.) 
Because Evans failed to present evidence establishing prima facie 
claims of deficient performance or resulting prejudice, his assertions of error fail. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted. 
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Nellsch v. 
State, 122 Idaho 426,434,835 P.2d 661,669 (Ct. App. 1992). 
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C. General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho 
at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 
550 (1983). However, a petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint 
in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain more than "a short and plain 
statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho 
at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P. 8). The petitioner must submit 
verified facts within his personal knowledge and produce admissible evidence to 
support his allegations. kl (citing I.C. § 19-4903). Furthermore, the factual 
showing in a post-conviction relief application must be in the form of evidence 
that would be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 
612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 
P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. ''To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises 
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no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's claims. 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a 
petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept 
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 
P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001)). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, 
the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing 
the petition. kl (citing Stuartv. State, 118 Idaho 865,869,801 P.2d 1216, 1220 
(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting 
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original 
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." kl 
D. Evans Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claim 
That The Dual Representation By Counsel Of He And His Co-Defendant 
Wife Constituted Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
Evans claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to "adequately 
separate her representation of [Evans] and his wife by negotiating [Evans'] wife's 
plea resolution to be contingent on [Evans'] guilty plea." (R., p.67.) The district 
court summarily dismissed this claim, finding Evans' had failed to present 
evidence establishing an actual conflict of interest. (R., pp.119-120.) On appeal, 
Evans argues there was an actual conflict of interest in the dual representation of 
himself and his co-defendant wife where "the plea deals offered to both 
defendants were contingent on Mr. Evans pleading to a felony, while hi co-
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defendant would have her charges reduced to a misdemeanor." (Appellant's 
brief, p.7.) Because this assertion of actual conflict is belied by the record and 
applicable case law, Evans' argument fails. 
"Joint representation of defendants is not per se ineffective assistance of 
counsel." State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,511,988 P.2d 1170, 1185 (1999) 
(citation omitted). Rather, a defendant seeking relief based on an alleged conflict 
of interest, to which she did not object at trial, must demonstrate that counsel 
"actively represented conflicting interests" and that the conflict of interest actually 
affected the adequacy of the lawyer's performance. Hairston, 133 Idaho at 511, 
988 P.2d at 1185; see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) (where 
defendant alleges a conflict based upon his counsel's simultaneous 
representation of defendant and the prosecutor's key witness, defendant must 
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's 
performance); State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703, 215 P.3d 414, 423 (2009) 
("Whether a trial court's failure to adequately inquiry, but the defendant did not 
object to the conflict at trial, the defendant's conviction will only be reversed if he 
or she can prove that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's 
performance.") An actual conflict is defined by its effect on counsel, not by 
whether there is a "mere theoretical division of loyalties." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 
U.S. 162, 171, 172 n.5 (2002). "[T]he possibility of conflict is insufficient to 
impugn a criminal conviction." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 62, 106 P.3d 376, 
388 (2004) (citations omitted). Absent a showing of actual conflict, a defendant 
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is not entitled to reversal of her conviction. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 173-74; Burger 
v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987). 
As the district court concluded in granting summary dismissal of Evans' 
petition for post-conviction relief, Evans "was represented by counsel he and his 
wife retained." (R., p.117.) That Evans was aware of the dual representation 
was "obvious" based on the fact that "they all appeared in court simultaneously." 
(Id.) Evans asserts on appeal "an actual conflict is evident in his case" because 
both he and his co-defendant wife's "pleas were contingent on [him] accepting 
this deal." (Appellant's brief, pp.10-11.) This assertion is not supported by the 
record. 
At the change of plea hearing, counsel for Evans explained the nature of 
the plea negotiations with the state: 
MS. DODGE: Sherry [sic] Dodge representing both Troy and 
Sadena. 
THE COURT: And I understand we're going to be doing a 
change of plea today; is that right? 
MS. DODGE: That's right, on Troy. And on Sadena, once we 
enter the plea with Troy, then that's going to be remand [sic] for 




A plea agreement on Troy? 
Yes. 
Can one of you put it on the record? 
MS. DODGE: Judge, the offer in this case is that Mr. Evans 
will be pleading guilty to, I believe, it's Count 7, which is sexual 
abuse of a minor under 16. Mr. Evans agrees to waive Estrada for 
PSI. and SANE evaluation. The state will be recommending a 5 
plus 10 for unified sentence of 15. It will recommend probation if 
the psychosexual returns as low risk and a good candidate for 
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community-based treatment. If probation is granted, the state will 
be asking for local incarceration with a maximum of 1 year. 
Obviously, he will follow through with the SANE treatment as 
recommended in the evaluation. Suspend all fines, and the facts 
can be considered and argued at sentencing, and all victims may 
read the PSI and submit the victim-impact statement, and then the 
no contact with minors. 
(6/2/2010 Tr., p.1, L.12 - p.2, L.15.) The negotiations ultimately reduced the 
seven counts of felony sex offenses to one count of sexual abuse of a minor with 
a possible probation recommendation by the state. 
Evans argues on appeal that he and his wife's pleas "hinged on his entry 
of that plea" to the one count of sex abuse which would "indicate that [his] 
interests were at odds with his wife's, and that counsel was no longer able to 
fulfill all her responsibilities to [him]." (Appellant's brief, pp.11-12.) Contrary to 
Evans' argument, the record does not support a factual claim that his wife's 
benefit of the plea bargain was contingent on the entry of his plea. (See, R., 
pp.118-119.) Further, had Evans' co-defendant wife's negotiated resolution been 
contingent on Evans' plea, that alone does not constitute a conflict of interest that 
actually affected trial counsel's performance. See State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 
530, 537-538, 211 P.3d 775, 783 (Ct. App. 2008) (although joint plea agreements 
are not favored, they are not improper). 
What the record does show is that Evans was charged with multiple 
felonies carrying lengthy possible terms of incarceration but due to the 
negotiations engaged in between his counsel and the state, he was given the 
opportunity of a potential probation sentence for one felony conviction while his 
co-defendant wife would only face a misdemeanor charge. This does not 
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establish the active representation of conflicting interests, nor does it establish a 
conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of Evans' lawyer's 
performance. Just the opposite, it appears Evans received a beneficial 
resolution through the representation of he and his wife by trial counsel. 
Because Evans failed to meet his burden of showing an actual conflict of 
interest, much less that trial counsel's performance was adversely affected by an 
actual conflict of interest, he has failed to show error in the summary dismissal of 
his conflict of interest claim. 
E. Evans Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claim 
That Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Adequately Investigate The 
Claims Against Him 
In his amended petition for post-conviction relief, Evans asserted his trial 
counsel "failed to investigate discrepancies between the grand jury transcript and 
the police reports, investigate the appropriate statute of limitations, and file an 
appropriate Motion to Dismiss Indictment." (R., p.66.) On appeal, Evans asserts 
had trial counsel followed through "on the legitimate concern that three of the 
charges levied against him were improper," he would have gone to trial instead of 
pleading guilty. (Appellant's brief, p.15.) The district court held that because the 
challenged charges were dismissed as part of the plea agreement, Evans had 
failed to present a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., 
pp.111-112.) Evans has failed to demonstrate error in the district court's 
analysis. 
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-
conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting 
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prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. 
Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). An attorney's 
performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson 
v. State, 110 Idaho 631,634,718 P.2d 283,286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 
Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To establish prejudice, a 
defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Aragon 
v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 
Idaho 681,685, 978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). The United States Supreme 
Court has recently reiterated: 
Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task. An 
ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules 
of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and 
so the Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care, 
lest intrusive post-trial inquiry threaten the integrity of the very 
adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve. 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (citations and quotations 
omitted). 
As the court discussed in summarily dismissing Evans' petition for post-
conviction relief, the charges of concern were dismissed pursuant to plea 
negotiations. (R., p.111.) The court concluded there was no showing of deficient 
performance or prejudice in getting the charges dismissed through plea 
negotiations as opposed to through the filing of a motion to dismiss. (R., p.112) 
Moreover, Evans failed to provide evidence sufficient to establish that a motion to 
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dismiss the challenged counts would have been successful. (Id.) Both of these 
conclusions are supported by the record and the law. Evans failed to carry his 
burden of establishing either deficient performance or resulting prejudice. 
Therefore, he has also failed to show error in the denial of his post-conviction 
petition. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Evans' petition for post-conviction relief. 
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